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Wilfrid Laurier University Leaf
September 21, 2017
Canadian Excellence

Dr. Neil Campbell


Contact Information
Phone: 519-884-0710 ext.3548
Fax: 519-884-4565
Office Location: S009

Academic Background

My main area of research is the Philosophy of Mind. I am particularly interested in the problem of mental causation, arguments for qualia epiphenomenalism, and the question of whether or not explanations appealing to an agent's reasons for acting are causal explanations. 

Some recent publications include:

“Do MacDonald and MacDonald Solve the Problem of Mental Causal Relevance?” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel Vol. 41 no. 4 (2013) pp. 1149-1158.

“Reasons and the First-Person: Explanatory Exclusion and Explanatory Pluralism,” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review Vol. 52 no. 1 (2013) pp. 25-42.

“The Failure of the Frankfurt Style Example,” International Journal of Critical Cultural Studies Vol. 10 no. 1 (2013) pp. 35-41.

“Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument,” Erkenntnis Vol. 76 no. 1 (2012) pp. 137-145.

“Functional Reduction and Mental Causation,” (with Dwayne Moore) Acta Analytica Vol. 25 no. 4 (2010) pp. 435-446.

“Explanatory Exclusion and the Intensionality of Explanation,” Theoria Vol. 76 nos. 3-4 (2010) pp. 207-220.

“On Kim’s Exclusion Principle,” (with Dwayne Moore) Synthèse Vol. 169 no. 1 (2009) pp 75-90.

Mental Causation: A Nonreductive Approach (New York: Peter Lang, 2008). 

“Explanatory Exclusion and the Individuation of Explanations,” Facta Philosophica Vol. 10 nos. 1/2 (2008) pp. 25-38.

“Explanatory Epiphenomenalism,” The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 55 no. 220 (2005) pp. 437-451.

“Generalizing Qualia Inversion,” Erkenntnis Vol. 60, no. 1 (2004) pp. 27-34.

“Causes and Causal Explanations: Davidson and his Critics,” Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel Vol. 31 nos. 1-2 (2003) pp. 149-157.

“An Inconsistency in the Knowledge Argument,” Erkenntnis Vol. 58, no. 2 (2003) pp. 261-266.